I. INTRODUCTION
What ethical obligations and duties to non-clients do lawyers have in drafting contracts? While significant scholarly attention has been given to lawyers' professional responsibilities in negotiating contracts, 1 especially settlement agreements, 2 there has been little written, either by bar associations 3 or scholars, 4 on the ethics of contract drafting. The lawyer
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ad hoc, and unclear tests 15 give attorneys uncertain guidance in drafting contracts and risk jeopardizing attorney loyalty to their clients. 16 Attorneys should not be liable to non-clients absent fraud, 17 unless the non-client is a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the lawyer and his or her client for the attorney's services. 18 Such an approach makes the standard for third-party attorney liability and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) 19 consistent as applied to lawyers drafting contracts.
Contract theory also illuminates lawyers' obligations in drafting contracts. Under any objective theory of contract, parties must manifest assent to the valid terms of their agreement regardless of whether there is any subjective "meeting of the minds." 20 Even the client who receives poor legal advice before signing a contract still assents to it. This Article does not discuss at length the lawyer's obligations to his or her own client warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability."). A lawyer who commits malpractice, on the other hand, most likely has violated the Model Rules. See id. R. 1.1-1. 4 . 15 See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1961) (balancing factors, including "the policy of preventing future harm," in order to determine whether the beneficiary of a will could recover against the attorney who negligently drafted it). 16 See, e.g., Favata v. Rosenberg, 436 N.E.2d 49, 51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (upholding privity requirement "because of the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship and the potential for conflicts of interest which might arise if such liability were extended to non-clients"); Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 200 (Wyo. 1990) (stating "it is fundamental" that a lawyer cannot assume a duty to a third party in a contract without violating his primary duty to his client; that " [t] he situation emphasizes scriptural wisdom. 'No servant can serve two masters. For he will either hate the one and love the other, or he will cling to the one and despise the other.'" (quoting Luke 16:13 (Richmond Lattimore Trans.))). 17 Fraud has historically been an exception to the traditional common law requirement of privity. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 18 See, e.g., McIntosh County Bank v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, 745 N.W.2d 538, 547 (Minn. 2008) (permitting recovery where the third party is the "direct" and "intended" beneficiary of the attorney's legal services). See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text. 19 See infra Part II (discussing lawyers' professional obligations under the Model Rules for drafting contracts). To date, California is the only state that has not adopted professional conduct rules that mirror the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 269, 305-08 (1986) [hereinafter Barnett, Consent Theory] (advocating for a "consent theory" by which contracts are interpreted "with an eye towards honoring the actual intentions of the parties"). LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:3 when drafting a contract 21 because those obligations are similar in any type of representation. 22 But the lawyer who engages in, counsels, or fails to disclose fraud threatens the core of any contract. 23 This Article seeks to define and proscribe such conduct. Conceptualizing contracting as cooperative rather than competitive is consistent with one of the purposes of contract law-to promote trust 24 -and offers the most promise for developing a set of functional ethical rules for lawyers in drafting contracts.
Part II of this Article looks at the application of Model Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(a) and (b), and 8.4 to attorneys drafting contracts. It considers three situations: (a) the lawyer who knowingly or recklessly drafts false representations and warranties; (b) fraud, conscious ambiguity, and errors in transcription by the lawyer or opposing lawyer; and (c) the lawyer who knowingly drafts an invalid or "iffy" contract provision. 25 Part III discusses the various approaches used in the case law to define a lawyer's liability to non-parties and discusses cases that have arisen in the contract-drafting context concerning a lawyer's liability to (a) non-parties and (b) the opposing party to the contract. Part IV offers the rationale for the ethical rules and third-party liability standard that 21 For such a discussion, see Kunz, supra note 4, at 493-99 (discussing the contract-drafting lawyer's duties to his or her own client under the Model Rules). 22 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1-1.18 (2008) (describing lawyers' duties to their clients). 23 See Randy E. Barnett Barnett, Rational Bargaining] ("Unlike the case of force or duress, a manifestation of consent that is fraudulently induced does reflect the knowledge of the person consenting, but the resources actually received by the defrauded transferee do not conform to the description communicated by the transferor. Due to the transferor's failure to deliver resources conforming to the rights he communicated and conveyed by his manifestation of consent, a legal remedy is needed to close the unjust gap that has arisen between the distribution of resources and the distribution of rights."). It is arguable that fraud can interfere with assent. See Contracts, supra note 20, § 136 ("The general rule is that a person is bound by an agreement to which he or she has assented, where this assent is uninfluenced by fraud, violence, undue influence, or the like, and he or she will not be permitted to say that he or she did not intend to agree to its terms."); see also id. § 37 ("An essential prerequisite to the creation of a contract is manifestation of mutual assent which must be gathered from the words or acts of the parties . . . . The undisclosed intention is immaterial in the absence of mistake, fraud, and the like . . . ."). For the contrary view, see Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1356-57 (2009) (arguing that fraud is wholly separate from contract law and that a valid contract can exist in cases of fraud or misrepresentation); Andrew Kull, Unilateral Mistake: The Baseball Card Case, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 57, 69-70 (1992) (arguing that fraud and mistake do not affect the formation of contract according to the prevailing "objective" view of contract formation). 24 See infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text. 25 For the definitions of invalid and "iffy" terms, see infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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this Article prescribes, and provides recommendations for the transactional lawyer who drafts contracts.
II. LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN DRAFTING CONTRACTS
The Model Rules place only limited restrictions on a lawyer's conduct in drafting contracts. The Model Rules bar attorneys from knowingly making material misrepresentations and from assisting clients in pursuing illegal or fraudulent conduct. 26 Indeed, the Model Rules are premised on an adversarial system; they presume adverse parties, zealous advocates, and a neutral tribunal. 27 They were never designed to guide lawyers' transactional work, including the drafting of contracts, which is often non-adversarial and cooperative. 28 Nevertheless, scholars have written about lawyers' ethical obligations in non-adversarial work, including contract drafting. 29 From this work has 26 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 4.1; Amy J. Schmitz, Ethical Considerations in Drafting and Enforcing Consumer Arbitration Clauses, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 841, 870 (2008) . 27 See Flowers, supra note 11, at 951-54 (discussing the history of the Model Rules and their basis in the adversarial system); cf. Menkel-Meadow, Non-Adversarial Lawyering, supra note 5, at 155 (discussing a need for "functional ethics" that would better account for lawyers' transactional, non-adversarial work). See also supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussing the lawyer's role as zealous advocate). 28 See, e.g., Timothy L. By contrast, in most jurisdictions, a cause of action for fraud must include reliance and injury. In this context, fraud requires that: (i) a misrepresentation was made; (ii) the misrepresentation was made with scienter (i.e., the person making the misrepresentation knew it was false or made it recklessly without sufficient knowledge as to whether it was true); (iii) the party making the misrepresentation intended for the obligations 
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other party to the contract to rely upon it; (iv) the other party justifiably relied on the misrepresentation; and (v) the counterparty suffered injury as a result of the misrepresentation. 37 Although reliance and injury are not required under the Model Rules for an attorney to be culpable for fraud, 38 when they exist, a lawyer is almost certain to face discipline. For example, in In re Silverman, 39 the court determined that an attorney engaged in "fraud" under the disciplinary rules because he submitted a prospectus and loan application that contained "omissions and affirmative misrepresentations, intended by [the attorney] to induce favorable decisions by the various parties," and which, in fact, induced reliance and injury. 40 The prospectus contained "exaggerations" of his client's worth and "knowing misrepresentations of highly material facts." 41 The court held that the attorney's conduct was fraudulent and a clear violation of the state's ethics code, which proscribes conduct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." 42 The second question that arises regarding the "fraud rules" is what is "knowingly"? Rule 1.0(f) defines "knowingly" as "actual knowledge of the fact in question," adding "[a] person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances."
43 Section 98 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers distinguishes "knowingly" under contract or tort law from "knowingly" under professional disciplinary rules. 44 A lawyer can be liable to third parties for a "reckless as well as [a] knowing misrepresentation," but "[f]or purposes of professional discipline, the lawyer codes generally incorporate the definition of misrepresentation employed in the civil law of tort damage liability . . . including the elements of falsity, scienter, and materiality." 45 A lawyer who recklessly makes a false statement or advises a client to engage in fraudulent conduct is likely not liable under the disciplinary rules. 46 Nevertheless, a lawyer is well-advised that reckless misconduct amounting to fraud is likely actionable by third parties. The remaining discussion in Part II of this Article examines (a) the lawyer who knowingly drafts false representations and warranties; (b) fraud, conscious ambiguity, and errors in transcription by the lawyer or the lawyer for a counterparty 48 to a contract; and (c) the lawyer who knowingly drafts an invalid or "iffy" contract provision.
A. Fraudulent Representations and Warranties
A seller of goods, real estate, or a business, for example, gives representations and warranties to the buyer in order to induce the buyer to enter into a contract for sale. 49 A representation "is a statement of fact . . . as of a moment in time" (i.e., when the contract is signed) that is "intended to induce reliance." 50 An attorney who knowingly drafts fraudulent representations in a contract on behalf of a client assists the client in fraud and violates Model Rule 1.2(d). 51 Additionally, even if the agreement is not executed, by incorporating representations into the terms of an agreement on behalf of a client that the attorney, but not the other party or its agent, knows are false, the attorney violates Rules 4.1(a) 52 and 8.4.
53
The lawyer violates these rules by indirectly 48 This Article uses "counterparty" to refer to a non-client party to the contract the lawyer is drafting. Of course, there can be more than one counterparty to a contract. 49 See STARK, supra note 29, at 12. 50 Id. By contrast, Professor Stark believes that a warranty is a promise that a statement of fact is true or will be true in the future. See id. at 13. For example, "the cup does not leak" is a representation, whereas "the cup will not leak" is a warranty. There is disagreement, however, whether the terms "warranty" and "representation" mean different things. (arguing that whether a statement is a representation or warranty affects the remedies available to a plaintiff if the assertion is false). A misrepresentation can give rise to a tort claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, whereas breach of warranty is a contract action. See id. at 9. In at least some states, a fraudulent warranty is not actionable. See West & Lewis, supra note 37, at 1014. In their article on extracontractual reliance, Glenn West and Benton Lewis contend that whether statements are labeled "representations" or "representations and warranties," they should not give rise to fraud claims when negotiated between sophisticated parties because they are risk-allocation devices subject to the agreed contractual remedies. What if representations are true when the contract is executed, but circumstances change that make them false before they are certified as true at closing? Consider the following example. 55 A lawyer assists a client in the sale of a bookstore. The representations and warranties regarding the financials of the client's bookstore were truthful when the seller and buyer executed the contract. After execution of the contract, but prior to closing, the client informs the lawyer that the most recent financials for the bookstore show a significant downturn in sales from the information that had been provided to the buyer. The client can no longer truthfully certify that the representations and warranties are correct at the time of closing but the client wants to do so anyway.
If the lawyer continues to represent the client with regard to the sale, the lawyer must either counsel the client to disclose the changed financials (and not to certify the representations and warranties as accurate), or disclose the changed financials himself. For the lawyer to fail to do so violates Model Rule 4.1(b). 56 The attorney would not have to make this disclosure if prohibited by Rule 1.6, the lawyer's duty of confidentiality to the client. 57 But Rule 1.6 has a permissive exception "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to comply with other law or a court order." 58 The law in question is Rule 1.2(d), or the lawyer's obligation not to assist the client in conduct that he knows is fraudulent. 59 Consequently, the lawyer has no choice but to disclose the changed financials if the client will not do so and the lawyer and client wish for the lawyer to continue to represent the client with regard to the sale. 60 257, 270 (1992) . While it is perhaps better for lawyers to use other contractual provisions to accomplish such risk-sharing, using representations and warranties in this way should not amount to misconduct, regardless of whether the statements are referred to as "representations" or "representations and warranties." 54 The lawyer also could decide to withdraw from representation if the client insists on not disclosing the new financials. 61 If the lawyer withdraws, he is most likely not "assisting" the client in any fraud because the lawyer counseled against certifying the representations and warranties without further disclosure and modification. This is true even if the client fails to disclose the new financials and falsely certifies the representations and warranties as true at the time of closing. Moreover, in this case, Rule 1.6 permits, but does not require, the attorney to disclose to the buyer or the buyer's lawyer that the representations and warranties are no longer true if, to do so, is necessary to avoid "substantial injury to the financial interests or property" of the buyer. 62 In other words, the seller's attorney may both withdraw from representation (under Rule 1.16(b)) and disclose to the buyer's attorney that the contractual representations are no longer truthful (under Rule 1.6(b)(2)). Indeed, this is likely the most prudent course of action for the attorney; it makes it clear the attorney is not "assisting" in any fraudulent conduct by the seller.
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A lawyer must also not be involved in knowingly preparing a fraudulent offering statement. This is a clear-cut example of fraud at the "unethical" end of the spectrum of lawyer conduct in drafting contracts.
B. Transcription Fraud, Ambiguity, and Errors
This next subpart looks at a lawyer's ethical obligations to disclose a scrivener's error in the transcription of an agreement and to refrain from fraud, and in some cases ambiguity, in drafting.
Scrivener's Errors
Prior to the enactment of the current Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 on February 1, 1977, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York issued an ethics opinion stating that an attorney was obligated under then-prevailing Canons 15 and 41 to inform opposing counsel of a computing error that benefitted the attorney's client. 67 The opinion advised that this duty existed even if the attorney's client expressly disapproved of disclosure. 68 In the order giving rise to the opinion, the court entered judgment against the client and opposing counsel mistakenly requested less money than his client was entitled to under the judgment. 69 The ethics opinion, stating that "[a]n attorney must obey his own conscience and not that of his client," advised that the attorney had an affirmative duty to report the error if for no other reason than to prevent the court from taking "action which is not in accordance with the 64 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 cmt. c, illus. 1 (2000) . 65 See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 46, § 4.1-2. 66 In 1908, the American Bar Association ("ABA"), which had existed as a professional organization for lawyers since 1878, adopted Where a transcription of an agreement contains a scrivener's error, an attorney cannot allow his or her client to benefit from the mistake and must notify the other party's attorney. 73 In ABA Informal Ethics Opinion 86-1518, the attorney for party A discovered that the lawyer for party B inadvertently omitted a material provision to an agreement between party A and party B, a provision without which party B would not have agreed to the contract. 74 The opinion advised that the lawyer for party A had an obligation to correct the error and not allow his client to take "unfair advantage" of the mistake. 75 The client's right to receive zealous representation, or "to expect committed and dedicated representation [pursuant to Model Rule 1.2,] is not unlimited."
76 If party A's lawyer were to capitalize on the error, he would have raised a "serious question" about whether he violated Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(b), and 8.4(c). 77 The opinion also advised that 70 
Id. at 261 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK Canon 15 (1908))
. 71 Id. This obligation is arguably analogous to the lawyer's obligation to refrain from conduct "involving dishonesty" under Model Rule 8. he Committee is of the opinion that you are under no obligation to reveal to the other counsel his omission of a material term in the transaction. Based on the facts set forth in your letter, it does not appear that you or your client have made any false statement of material fact or law to the other side at any time during the negotiations, and, furthermore, the omission in no way is attributable to a fraudulent act committed by you or your client.").
76 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1518. 77 See id.
the attorney for party A had no obligation to inform his client of the error because "the decision on the contract ha [d] already been made by the client." 78 The client had agreed to the contract with the term that party B's lawyer omitted. 79 Of course, it might be more practical for the attorney under these facts to disclose the mistake to his or her client and encourage the client to agree to disclosure.
Similarly, an attorney who takes advantage of a scrivener's error to settle a lawsuit could be engaging in fraud under Rule 8. 4 . The State Bar of New Mexico issued an advisory opinion in response to a lawyer's request for advice upon receiving a check from an insurance company for $14,000 to settle a lawsuit, when the company's previous offer had been $1,400 (and the insurance company had apparently intended to send a check for $1,400). 80 While the Bar condemned the insurance company's tactic of intending to issue a check for far below the $10,000 that the attorney communicated it would take to settle his client's personal injury lawsuit, the Bar cited ABA Informal Advisory Opinion 86-1518 and concluded that the attorney should disclose to the company its apparent error "to act with honesty and to avoid a possible fraud."
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Lawyers cannot ethically permit clients to capitalize on a scrivener's error of the opposing party's counsel. This is generally consistent with contract law-a contract containing a scrivener's error will not be enforced, but will be rewritten to reflect the parties' actual agreement. ( holding that when attorney knew that opposing party was under the mistaken belief that checks tendered in settlement were for the amount to which the parties had agreed, the lawyer had an obligation to notify the opposing party and should not have negotiated the checks, disbursed the proceeds, and refused to return the overpayment). 82 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155 (1981) ("Where a writing that evidences or embodies an agreement in whole or in part fails to express the agreement because of a mistake of both parties as to the contents or effect of the writing, the court may at the request of a party reform the writing to express the agreement, except to the extent that rights of third parties such as good faith purchasers for value will be unfairly affected."). See also Parrish v. City of Carbondale, 378 N.E.2d 243, 248 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (reforming easement where provision left out of agreement by mutual mistake); Olds v. Jamison, 238 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Neb. 1976) ("[I]f a clause was inserted in a deed by mistake on the part of the scrivener who drew it, then the mistake was mutual, because it was contrary to the real intention and agreement of the parties. The fact that one of the parties to a contract LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:3
Fraud and Ambiguity in Transcription
When parties represented by attorneys negotiate a sophisticated agreement, an attorney for one party prepares a draft, the other party comments, the parties negotiate, and another draft is prepared. 83 The attorneys exchange draft agreements back and forth and often either show their proposed changes via redline or blackline, or make written comments on the other party's draft. 84 At least three types of situations that arise when attorneys propose and exchange draft language can raise questions as to a lawyer's ethical obligations: (a) If attorneys have established a practice of highlighting proposed changes when negotiating an agreement, does that practice impose a duty on the attorneys to highlight material alterations? (b) Should an attorney knowingly draft written terms in an agreement that differ materially from the terms the parties have negotiated, without disclosing the differences to the counterparty to the agreement? (c) Should an attorney knowingly draft an ambiguous provision in a written agreement without disclosing the ambiguity to the counterparty, when the provision that the parties negotiated is unambiguous?
a. Fraud Although Hennig v. Ahearn
85 involved a non-attorney's liability to a contract's counterparty, its facts are illustrative of the first situation and the ethical issues it raises. In this Wisconsin case, the president of a corporation, without his attorney's knowledge or assistance, changed a material provision of an executive compensation agreement before asking a company executive to sign it. 86 The president did not alert the executive or his attorney to the alteration, a departure from how the denies that a mistake was made does not prevent a finding of mutual mistake nor prevent reformation."); Davenport v. Beck, 576 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977) ("The law under these circumstances is that where by reason of a scrivener's mistake an instrument omits or contains terms or stipulations contrary to the common intention of the parties . . . a court of equity will consider it a mutual mistake common to both parties [,] that is, the scrivener left out or included provisions neither party intended [,] and therefore correct the error in a manner that will place the parties in the position they would have occupied had the error not occurred." (internal quotation marks omitted)). For more information about scrivener's errors, see supra note 8. 83 See, e.g., James B. parties' attorneys had highlighted the numerous changes proposed when negotiating the agreement back and forth and how "the evolving terms of the agreement were expressly discussed among the parties and their attorneys." 87 The executive signed the agreement; neither he nor his attorney reviewed the entire agreement, nor did they note the material change. 88 The executive sued the president and the corporation for misrepresentation and reformation of the contract; at the close of the plaintiff's case at trial, the court entered judgment for the defendants because there was insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff's claims. 89 On appeal, the court first held that a jury could find that the president had a duty to disclose, under Wisconsin law, the last-minute alteration that he had made to the executive's compensation agreement. 90 The question was whether the executive had a "reasonable expectation of disclosure." 91 The court concluded that the plaintiff had presented credible evidence of a claim for intentional misrepresentation or fraud, and left it to the trial court to determine whether there was credible evidence of the plaintiff's negligent and strict liability misrepresentation claims.
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The court next turned to whether the executive's reliance was reasonable. The defendants contended that because the executive was experienced in business, represented by counsel, and had 30 hours to review the agreement, and because the terms of the agreement were unambiguous, the plaintiff could not have relied on any non-disclosure. 93 The court found that whether it was reasonable for the executive to rely on the president's silence as to the last-minute alteration to the compensation agreement was a question of fact for the jury. 94 The court refused to hold that "a party must read each and every word of successive drafts of a complex commercial document in order to ensure that another party has not surreptitiously inserted a significant last-minute change," 95 which explains, in part, why an attorney has ethical obligations to non-clients in drafting contracts.
The court further stated that reformation of the contract would be appropriate if the plaintiff made a unilateral mistake and the defendants engaged in "fraud or inequitable conduct." 96 The court quoted section 166 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which states: 87 Id. at 23. 88 Id. at 20. 89 Id. at 21. 90 Id. at 23. 91 See id. at 22-23. 92 Id. at 25-26. 93 Id. at 24. 94 Id. at 24-25. 95 Id. at 25. 96 Id. at 26. LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:3
If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by the other party's fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents or effect of a writing evidencing or embodying in whole or in part an agreement, the court at the request of the recipient may reform the writing to express the terms of the agreement as asserted, (a) if the recipient was justified in relying on the misrepresentation . . . .
97
Thus, under this analysis, if the president failed to disclose the lastminute alteration so that the executive would sign the agreement without knowledge of the change, the president's conduct was fraudulent. 98 The court found that the failure of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney to exercise reasonable care in reviewing the agreement did not bar the plaintiff's claim for reformation as long as his reliance on the president's non-disclosure (the terms of the written agreement) was justified. 99 The failure to read does not provide an absolute bar to relief in a contract action.
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If the executive's attorney had assisted his client in making the lastminute alteration to the contract without disclosing it, the attorney could have violated several disciplinary rules. 101 For example, if the last-minute alteration was fraudulent, the attorney would have assisted in his client's fraud under Model Rule 1.2(d) 102 and failed to disclose it under Rule 4.1(b).
103 Two commentators believe it is a "false statement of material fact" under Rule 4.1(a) for an attorney not to disclose a last-minute material alteration to a third person under these circumstances, knowing 97 
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 166 (1981))
. 98 See id. at 26-27 ("A, seeking to induce B to make a contract to sell a tract of land to A for $100,000, makes a written offer to B. A knows that B mistakenly thinks that the offer contains a provision under which A assumes an existing mortgage and that it does not contain such a provision, but does not disclose this to B for fear that B will not accept. B is induced by A's non-disclosure to sign the writing, which is an integrated agreement. A's non-disclosure is equivalent to an assertion that the writing contains such a provision . . . and amounts to a fraudulent misrepresentation. At the request of B, the court will reform the writing to add the provision for assumption." (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 166 cmt. a, illus. 4 (1981))). 99 Id. at 27. 100 Cf. Egle & Annen, supra note 83, at 18 ("In such cases, an opportunity exists for an unscrupulous party preparing the final draft to revise, add, or delete sections without informing the other party. Where the agreement is long and the revision is subtle, it might get past the unsuspecting opposing counsel. Should the duty to read apply under such circumstances?"). 101 The attorney could have also been liable to the plaintiff for fraud under the traditional exception to the rule that an attorney has no liability to a third party. 
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that the other party would not agree to the change. 104 And, while there is no relevant authority in this context where the attorneys followed a practice of marking their proposed alterations, it arguably would have been "dishonest" under Rule 8. 4 for an attorney not to disclose a material alteration.
105 At least part of the purpose of contract law is to "fortif[y] trust insofar as it provides grounds for confidence that another will perform a promise."
106 Promises are not trustworthy if they are made through an attorney's sleight of hand because their enforceability could become subject to challenge.
If the attorney in this case was asked to assist the client, he should have withdrawn from representation rather than making the alteration without disclosing it.
107 If the president went ahead and made the alteration, delivered the document to the executive, and the attorney knew about it but was no longer involved in representing the executive or his corporation with regard to the agreement, Rule 4.1(b) would not apply. 108 Here, a permissive exception to the attorney's duty of confidentiality would allow, but not require, the attorney to disclose the alteration.
109 Rule 1.6 says:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). In In re Conduct of Eadie, an attorney was disciplined for violating Oregon's version of Rule 8.4(c) when he executed a settlement agreement between Shon (his client) and a woman named Burke regarding the termination of an easement over Shon's property. 36 P.3d 468, 477 (Or. 2001). The court held that the attorney engaged in misrepresentation when he "intentionally failed to disclose a material fact-namely, that he intended to seek costs-to obtain Burke's acquiescence to settle her dispute with Shon." Id. In other words, an attorney cannot, consistent with Rule 8. 4 (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services.
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Because the executive was substantially harmed in agreeing to the alteration (his compensation was significantly lower), the attorney, if he had known about it, could have disclosed the alteration to the executive's attorney before the executive signed it. A set of ethical questions also arises if an attorney knowingly fails to memorialize an oral agreement consistent with what the parties intended and does not disclose to the counterparty or its attorney that he or she has failed to do so. The counterparty's attorney should read closely the initial draft of the agreement. 111 Because such careful review would be expected of an attorney, it is less conceivable than in Hennig that the counterparty justifiably relied on a misrepresentation, as required for a fraud claim and violation of Rules 1.2(d) and 4.1 (b) . 112 Yet, Rule 4.1(a) prohibits the drafting attorney from knowingly making "a false statement of material fact or law to a third person," 113 and if the attorney represents that a writing reflects the parties' agreement when she knows it does not, the attorney has violated this rule. Such conduct can also be "deceitful" or "dishonest" under Rule 8. 4(c) 114 as it threatens the trust that is part of the fabric of contract law. b. Conscious Ambiguity A more subtle form of an attorney not memorializing accurately an oral agreement is where an attorney uses "conscious ambiguity" in drafting. 116 The attorney knowingly includes a clause in an agreement with two contradictory meanings or two provisions that contradict.
117 If parties attach different meanings to an ambiguous provision or set of provisions, and the drafting attorney's client knew or had reason to know of the other party's understanding, the court will interpret the contract consistent with the meaning held by the other party. A word that may or may not be applicable to marginal objects is vague. But a word may also have two entirely different connotations so that it may be applied to an object and be at the same time both clearly appropriate and inappropriate, as the word 'light' may be when applied to dark feathers. Such a word is ambiguous."). Using vagueness in drafting contracts can achieve many economic efficiencies; the same efficiencies are not obtained by using ambiguous language. See Duhl, supra note 116, at 76 & n.28. 118 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(2) (1981) ("Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one of them if at the time the agreement was made (a) that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party; or (b) that party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party."). 119 I think we now have a confident view of how the negotiation occurred. Throughout the contract negotiation process the Cerberus side made it clear at all times that its contracting policy did not permit it to allow the Seller a specific performance remedy and the URI side pushed at all times to get them on the hook if the financing was available. URI tried to do that that [sic] in many ways on all three agreements (merger agreement, limited guarantee, equity commitment letter) without making all the progress they wanted.
The Cerberus legal team was under strict orders to keep the out clear to their side; Simpson [Thacher & Bartlett LLP] via [Eric] Swedenburg ultimately was under pressure to get Cerberus signed up as best he could. I believe he was lucky that the other side allowed 9.10 to stay in subject to 8.2(e) even if 8.2(e)'s final sentence added by [Peter] Ehrenberg reduced URI's optionality to force it to accept the payment of the reverse termination fee in a Cerberus breach. And, think about it, one can reasonably conclude from the evidence that URI and Simpson adopted this strategy deliberately-if so, they did a fantastic job given their hand even if Swedenburg was found not to be a forthright negotiator (there are other explanations here but for now let's take this one). According to Chandler, he almost succeeded and no doubt Chandler realized the higher probabilities of being reversed on summary judgment versus a trial and that must have factored into his thinking to deny summary judgment to URI. Sloppy drafting helped URI much more than Cerberus. At the time the deal was Perhaps the drafting by URI's lawyers does not rise to the level of "dishonesty" under Model Rule 8.4 because Cerberus's lawyers knew about and did not object to the ambiguity in the Merger Agreement, and with sophisticated attorneys on each side, the attorneys could police each other. 130 The conduct of URI's attorneys was even condoned by Harvard Law School Professor John C. Coates IV, an expert for URI, who stated in a report he submitted in the case that attorneys commonly use shortcuts such as "notwithstanding" and "subject to" to save time and costs in editing buyout and merger and acquisition agreements.
131
The Model Rules do not proscribe the ambiguous drafting by URI's attorneys. But neither is it prescribed and it undercuts the function of contract law to build trust, 132 at least in cases unlike United Rentals, where the counterparty is unaware of, and did not specifically agree to, ambiguity in the contract. Parties depend on unambiguous writing so they know to what they are manifesting assent and what agreement they can rely on the law to enforce. 133 Conscious ambiguity, at its extreme, is "dishonest" and could violate Rule 8.4.
executed, it may be that URI took a calculated risk that Cerberus wouldn't take the reputational hit of walking and (unfortunately) was wrong. Another reason that such legal drafting techniques are used is they reduce the amount of blacklining and editing that must be reviewed by the numerous parties who must approve and sign off on the final documentation. If, for example, drafters can add a single sentence that contains the phrase "subject to" or "notwithstanding," the various interested parties . . . can simply look at the one sentence to see the meaning of the change. If, on the other hand, a sentence is added while other sentences are modified or deleted to reflect the meaning of the new sentence and eliminate any potential apparent conflicts, more blacklining, on more pages, will have to be reviewed and evaluated by each party.
Id
Id. at 11. 132 See infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text. 133 See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 20, at 302 ("In contract law, this informational or 'boundary defining' requirement means that an assent to alienate rights must be manifested in some manner by one party to the other to serve as a criterion of enforcement. Without a manifestation of assent that is accessible to all affected parties, that aspect of a system of entitlements that governs transfers of rights will fail to achieve its main function. At the time of the transaction, it will have failed to identify clearly and communicate to both parties (and to third parties) the rightful boundaries that must be respected. Without such communication, parties to a transaction (and third parties) cannot accurately ascertain what constitutes rightful conduct and what constitutes a commitment on which they can rely. Disputes that might otherwise have been avoided will occur, and the attendant uncertainties of the transfer process will discourage reliance."). LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:3
C. "Iffy" and Invalid Clauses
When a lawyer drafts a form contract 134 that most, if not all, consumers will sign without receiving legal advice, the question arises as to whether the lawyer may draft an invalid 135 or "iffy" 136 term. 137 Currently, lawyers are proscribed from drafting "invalid" terms only in some circumstances; however, lawyers should be required to avoid drafting or otherwise conspicuously disclose terms they know are invalid in all circumstances.
Professor Christina Kunz, discussing invalid and "iffy" contract clauses under the Uniform Commercial Code, writes that "[Model] Rule 1.2 is violated when a lawyer suggests burying or actually buries an invalid provision in a contract (perhaps using obscure language or an unobvious location) or forwards a contract draft to the other party while aware that the draft contains this kind of concealment."
138 Professors Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes confirm that such result is possible, but the Model Rules do not make it explicit:
The highest court of State recently held that a certain clause in a consumer goods contract is unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. A retail store in State nevertheless insists that its 134 See supra note 13. 135 An "invalid" clause is one that is illegal. An example of an invalid clause is a provision that disclaims the implied warranty of habitability in a residential lease even though the law prohibits the landlord from disclaiming the warranty. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.47(1) (West 2004) ("A provision in a rental agreement is void and unenforceable to the extent that it . . . [p]urports to limit or preclude any liability of the landlord to the tenant . . . arising under law."); Knight v. Hallsthammar, 623 P.2d 268, 272 (Cal. 1981) ("[The] implied warranty of habitability and . . . public policy which generally prohibits waiver of that warranty is consistent with California's statutory pattern of landlord-tenant relations."). Additionally, an invalid clause could be a provision or provisions that make an agreement unconscionable. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2002) ("If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."). 136 An "iffy" clause is one in which the drafting attorney has at least a good-faith, but not certain, belief that it is valid in at least some of the jurisdictions in which it is used; if the attorney does not have that belief, the clause is invalid. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2008) ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law."). 137 Understanding the lawyer's ethical obligations in this context is critical because the lawyer's client relies on the lawyer to comply with the law. On the other hand, if the clause is likely to mislead customers as to their rights, use of the clause might be held to constitute fraud. If so, the general prohibition in Rule 1.2(d) against assisting in fraud would again be applicable.
139
The inquiry is not simply whether the clause is valid or invalid; for the lawyer to run afoul of the Model Rules, the lawyer knowingly had to assist his or her client in deceiving the consumer as to his or her rights.
140
Professor Paul Carrington agrees that the drafting of invalid clauses is impermissible if it misleads parties as to their rights. 141 He discusses the example of an attorney who decided to draft release-waivers for minors participating in a bicycle race. 142 The lawyer knew that the consents would be invalid if challenged because of the age of the minors. . 1973 ) (stating that "it is true that defendant[] (as have many before him and probably many will after him) failed to read the entire contract")); see also Carrington, supra note 4, at 364-65 ("[T]he reality is that most of the 'contracts' that most of us make as consumers are never read . . . . Frequently, as is often the case with insurance policies, the purchaser may not even have an opportunity to read or sign the written instrument because it is delivered after the transaction has been performed."). 141 See Carrington, supra note 4, at 371-73. 142 See id. at 371. The lawyer in Professor Carrington's example assumes that a certain percentage of injured minors' parents will be chilled from suing his client by the mere existence of the release. See id. 143 146 Carrington, supra note 4, at 380 el Rules proposed a prohibition against a lawyer assisting a client to conclude an agreement 'that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is illegal, contains legally prohibited terms, would work a fraud, or would be held to be unconscionable as a matter of law.' The latter term was intended to incorporate into the Rules the standard of Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code. It was criticized as too indeterminate to serve as the standard for quasi-criminal professional discipline. Perhaps that was the reason the provision was deleted in the final draft of the Rules." (footnotes omitted)). 147 An attorney wh el Rules. For example, in Florida Bar v. Frederick, the court broadly interpreted Rule 8.4(d), the rule prohibiting "'conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice'" to apply not only to "conduct 'in a judicial proceeding,'" but to all "'conduct in connection with the practice of law.'" 756 So. 2d 79, 87 (Fla. 2000) (quoting FLA.
STAT. ANN. BAR RULE 4-8.4(d) (West 2008)). The lawyer in
Frederick was subject to discipline for, among other things, requiring his clients to sign contracts saying they would not initiate disciplinary action against him. See Frederick, 756 So. 2d at 81. The lawyer alleged that Model Rule 8.4(d) applied only to lawyers engaged in discriminatory behavior against protected classes. Id. at 86-87. The court held, however, that the rule's commentary specifically discussing discriminatory behavior only broadened the rule, and did not constrict it. Id. at 87. In Frederick, requiring clients to sign contracts that they would not bring disciplinary actions against a lawyer was "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice." Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN.
BAR RULE 4-8.4(d) (quotation marks omitted)).
148 See Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Stat 8 1995) ("[F]reedom of contract has its limits. Even where there exists an offer, acceptance, and consideration, a court will not enforce a contract whose subject matter is illegal or contrary to public policy. . . . Sometimes a contract contains one illegal-and hence, unenforceable-provision along with other, perfectly legal, terms. Such a contract presents the court with three options. First, the court might simply rewrite the offending provision to make it conform to public policy. . . . Second, the court might refuse to enforce the entire contract, legal and illegal terms alike. . . . Finally, the court might sever the illegal provision and enforce the remainder of the otherwise valid contract. The law has adopted this third approach, no honest purpose for putting such a provision in the contract generally exists in the first place, especially when consumers are vulnerable because of their lack of bargaining power. 149 A lawyer engaged in the difficult line drawing necessary to distinguish between whether a contract provision is valid or invalid in certain jurisdictions, or concerned that the law might change, can disclose conspicuously in the agreement itself that a provision might be invalid. Such disclosure would avoid any risk of disadvantage to his or her client. 150 Disclosure signals that the contracting parties did not assent to the provision (if it is invalid), just as does omitting the provision altogether.
Here is an example from the warranty for the ShamWow! cleaning cloth. 151 The product comes with a warranty that states:
Square One Entertainment Inc. is not responsible for scratches or other damage arising from the use of the Shamwow! product where foreign materials or debris are present for products such as eyeglasses, sunglasses, camera lenses or other lenses, computer screens, television screens, LCD screens, cell phones, jewelry, silver, or other products.
152
This appears to be a limitation on consequential damages. 153 Yet, the warranty continues with a section titled "State Law": "This warranty gives with an important restriction. A court will sever an illegal term and enforce the remainder of an otherwise valid contract, but only where the illegal term 'is not an essential part of the agreed exchange.'" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 (1981))). 149 Moreover, a contract may be unenforceable due to procedural unco s , for example, courts determining whether or not there is procedural In New York unconscionability will focus on the "size and commercial setting of the transaction, whether deceptive or high-pressured tactics were employed, the use of fine print in the contract, the experience and education of the party claiming unconscionability, and whether there was a disparity in bargaining power." Gillman v. 154 This provision makes consumers aware that the consequential damage waiver might be ineffective in certain jurisdictions and that they should consult an attorney before deciding whether to seek recovery of consequential damages under the warranty.
In agreements where both parties are represented by counsel, the counterparty's attorney should be able to advise that party as to the validity of the terms in the contract. Because the attorney's knowledge is imputed to the client, 155 there is less risk that the counterparty will be defrauded and disadvantaged by conduct that could violate the Model Rules.
156 Yet, as contracts are signals to contracting parties as well as to third parties of the terms to which the parties have consented, 157 even in transactions where all parties are represented by counsel, the attorneydrafter should conspicuously disclose a contract provision that is invalid.
The functional ethics of contract drafting necessitates broadening the definition of "dishonesty" in Model Rule 8.4 to encompass lawyers who draft, but do not conspicuously disclose, invalid provisions in contracts. The more difficult scenario is the "iffy" provision-i.e., where the provision could be invalid, but the lawyer has a good-faith basis for thinking it is valid. 158 It is likely that inclusion of "iffy" clauses is permissible under the Model Rules. Although a lawyer's judgment must be informed, 159 he or she is not liable for the "true state of the law" if the 
III. LAWYERS' LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES
Because attorneys generally do not have a fiduciary relationship with non a lawyer was not responsible for advising his client that a tax deduction was permissible because no specific statute, regulation, or case specifically said it was not, and the lawyer used his judgment in concluding that it was. 162 Most lawyers drafting contracts are advocates and not neutrals, and it confounds their role to require them to opine on the validity of a contract term when they do not know whether it is valid.
-clients, the traditional rule is that they are only liable to third parties in cases of fraud or improper motive. 163 counterparty to a contract should not be extended, unless the counterparty is a third-party beneficiary to the lawyer's contract for services with the lawyer's client. 164 There are three reasons commonly cited for limiting lawyer liability to non-clients for negligence, all of which apply in the context of lawyers drafting contracts. 165 First, liability to third parties for negligence may undermine an attorney's duty to advocate zealously for his or her client and to fulfill his or her duties of confidentiality, loyalty, and care.
166 Such liability could be limited to cases where the attorney acts fraudulently, so the duty is consistent with the traditional rule of attorney liability. For more on the threat that fraud poses to contracting, see Barnett, Rational Bargaining, supra note 23, at 799-803. 164 Of course, the lawyer should proceed with caution to avoid any conflict of interest when the counterparty to a contract is also a third-party beneficiary to the lawy ' in actual loss to the client, is liable for the damages sustained."); 14 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (1968) ("An attorney is liable for the damages suffered by his client resulting from a breach of the duties imposed by this [fiduciary] relationship, such as acquiring a personal interest conflicting with those of his client, disclosing or using confidential information, and defrauding the client. He is also liable for damages his clients suffer because of his negligence in representing them, and it is to the handling of cases of this nature that this Article is directed."). 166 pose a conflict of interest for the lawyer who has duties to his or her client and duties to third parties. 167 While there are limitations on a lawyer's zealous representation in cases of fraud 168 or dishonesty, 169 those are practices, unlike carelessness, that undermine the integrity of the contracting process itself. 170 Second, attorney liability for negligence to non-clients could undermine the trust between client and attorney. 171 For example, a client may second guess whether his or her attorney's advice regarding the inclusion or omission of a particular contract provision is advantageous to the client, or whether the attorney is simply trying to avoid personal liability (i.e., hedging his or her bets) in case the contract goes awry. The law enforces promises to encourage trust; 172 creating attorney liability to third parties could undermine the same trust that the lawyer was retained to create.
Finally, a third reason has emerged in the context of contract drafting: permitting lawyer liability may "encourage a party to contractual negotiations to forego personal legal representation and then sue counsel representing the other contracting party for legal malpractice if the resulting contract later proves disfavorable in some respect."
173 In other words, the courts are worried there will be a free-rider problem; parties that should have their own counsel will rely on the counterparty's counsel yet sue that counsel if the agreement turns out unfavorable. en the attorney and client, which is an e e , 682 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (denying malpractice claim by a non-client party to a contract and holding that privity with atto e for tort claims such as professional negl e t because of the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship and the potential for conflicts of interest which might arise if such liability were extended to non-clients."); John H. Bauman, A Sense of Duty: Regulation of Lawyer Responsibility to Third Parties by the Tort System, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 995, 1031 (1996) (arguing that potential conflicts of interest limit lawyers' liability to third parties). 168 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d). 169 See id. R. 8.4(c). 170 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 171 See McIntosh Coun 9 ("It would also undermine the trust betwe ss ntial element of the relationship.")). 172 See infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text. 173 Chalpin v. Brennan, 559 P.2d 680 rn y is required for all malpractice claims). 174 This is also critical because some degree of reliance on the professional is necessary to fulfill the "causation" requirement ig nce. See Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 627, 655-56 (1973) ("[A] possible test for measuring the extent of liability for negligence is that of reasonable reliance. This means that a professional would be liable to those who reasonably rely on his negligent actions to their detriment, regardless of their actual relationship with him. Reliance as a justification for imposing liability espouses a policy decision that those who innocently and reasonably rely on a professional's work should not be required to bear a loss admittedly caused by another's negligence. And it limits liability so that a professional is liable only to those who LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:3
In light of these reasons, states have taken four approaches to defining a lawyer's liability to non-parties for negligence: (a) limiting liability to those with whom the lawyer is in privity; (b) extending liability beyond clients to third-party beneficiaries of the lawyer's contract with the client for the lawyer's services; (c) the California balancing approach; and (d) the "composite" approach of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. 175 Underlying each approach, the general rule is the same: lawyer liability to non-clients for negligence is the exception to the rule that lawyers are not liable to non-clients. 176 The privity approach is that only "those who have entered into a contract for legal services with the lawyer" may sue an attorney for negligence.
177 Therefore, an attorney would not be liable to anyone, other than his or her own client, for any negligence arising from the drafting of a contract. This approach is the most protective of lawyers and also the easiest for courts to apply. It is simple: no liability.
The third-party beneficiary exception to the traditional rule is slightly broader. It is based on a basic principle of contract law: parties can contractually create rights in third persons, and third persons can enforce those rights. 178 States that apply this approach permit recovery by third parties who are the "direct" and "intended" beneficiary of the attorney's services. 179 It is not critical, however, whether the party seeking recovery is a beneficiary to the contract the lawyer is drafting, though this is sometimes the case. 180 Rather, it is crucial whether the party is a thirdparty beneficiary to the contract between the lawyer and the client for the attorney's services.
181
There have been cases, however where the reasonably rely on his work."). Thus, once a court permits liability in the first place, reliance by third parties would likely increase as well. The "causation" element would then be easier to satisfy for third parties suing lawyers in negligence. 175 See Michels, supra note 164, at 150. In his comprehensive article, Kevin Michels discusses the various theories under which states have held (or not held) attorneys liable to third parties. The scope of Michels's article extends beyond drafting contracts, and addresses a variety of potential lawyer shortcomings-e.g., the failure to investigate, negligent drafting of wills, and fraudulent legal opinions. counterparty of a contract has alleged that she is a third-party beneficiary of the contract for the attorney's services. 182 The third approach, the so-called "California balancing" approach, weighs a set of factors to determine whether to hold an attorney liable to a non-client in a given case. 183 This approach is based largely on public policy, rather than on contract or tort law. The factors were originally announced in Biakanja v. Irving 184 and included:
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy for preventing future harm.
185
This test has been criticized as "ad hoc, unworkable, vague, difficult to use in practice, and of little use to a party to determine, in advance, the scope of possible duties." 186 The California balancing test has never been applied in a published case to permit recovery by a non-client against an attorney in a dispute arising from the drafting of a contract. It has been applied in malpractice cases arising primarily, if not exclusively, from the drafting of a will. 187 Finally, there is the approach of sections 51(2) and 51(3) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which set forth the "limited circumstances" in which a lawyer owes a duty of care to nonclients. 188 According to the Restatement, lawyers owe a duty to non-clients in situations where the non-client (1) is a prospective client (which is not relevant to the situations described in this Article); 189 (2) is invited to rely 182 See, e.g., Franko v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 1345, 1351-54 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (involving a contract for a loan between two parties who were involved in a romantic relationship; although the attorney represented one party, the second party claimed the contract was drafted solely for her benefit). See infra Part III.B for a discussion of this case. 183 See Michels, supra note 164, at 155. 184 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958) . 185 Id. at 19. In this case, the court found a notary public, who was not an attorney, liable to a beneficiary of a will for failing to have the will properly attested. Id. The factors in Biakanja were subsequently applied in a case in which the court found that an attorney who drafted a will could be liable to a beneficiary for negligent drafting. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Cal. 1961). Although the court in Lucas spent time discussing when a third party could recover from an attorney for malpractice, the plaintiffs in Lucas lost. The beneficiaries lost their benefit under the will owing to the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities, and the court said, in effect, that nobody understands the Rule, and the failure to deal with it properly is not negligence. 191 or (4) is owed certain enumerated fiduciary duties by the client (also not relevant here). 192 Thus, in the contract-drafting context, the Restatement would appear to permit recovery primarily in third-party beneficiary cases.
All of these approaches to liability are, from a practical standpoint, rarely used against a lawyer drafting a contract. For example, there are very few reported cases where one party to a contract sues the attorney of the other party to the contract. Where there is a dispute over a contract term, the party ordinarily challenges the term to avoid the contract 193 or sues the attorney's client for breach. Still, there have been a few cases in which courts have addressed attorney liability for contract drafting. The cases can be divided into two categories: cases where the issue is the attorney's liability to a non-party to the contract, which are discussed in Part III.A, and cases where the issue is the attorney's liability to a counterparty to the contract, which are discussed in Part III.B.
A. Attorney Liability to Non-Parties
For the reasons previously discussed, courts have not found attorneys liable to non-parties for negligence in drafting contracts. 194 However, non-parties who are third-party beneficiaries to the contract between the lawyer and the client for the lawyer's services should be able to recover from the attorney for professional negligence because, in those cases, both the lawyer and client are aware of, and agree to proceed in light of, the overlapping and diverging interests between the client and the nonparty. 195 The Minnesota Supreme Court faced the issue of whether an attorney was liable for negligent drafting to a non-party to a contract in McIntosh County Bank v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP. 196 In that case, Dorsey & Whitney, LLP (Dorsey) represented M & S bank in the negotiation and drafting of two loan agreements with the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe (Tribe). 197 The Tribe defaulted and defended on the ground that the contracts were unenforceable because the National Indian Gaming Commission did not approve the pledge agreement to the loans.
198
McIntosh County Bank (McIntosh), a plaintiff in the case, 199 was one of many banks that had purchased an interest in the loans and sued Dorsey for negligence in drafting the contracts that the Tribe alleged were unenforceable. 200 The question before the court was when (if ever) a lawyer drafting a contract owes a duty of care to a non-party to the contract.
201
The Minnesota court adopted a third-party beneficiary approach, outlining a limited exception to the general rule that attorneys owe a duty only to their clients in the absence of fraud. 202 The court stated, "[I]n order for a third party to proceed in a legal malpractice action, that party must be a direct and intended beneficiary of the attorney's services." 203 A "direct" beneficiary of a transaction, the court said, is where "the transaction has as a central purpose an effect on the third party and the effect is intended as a purpose of the transaction." 204 For the third party to be an "intended" beneficiary, the court said, "the attorney must be aware of the client's intent to benefit the third party." 205 The court LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:3
held that the purpose of the loan agreements was not to benefit McIntosh, but to close the loans, and even if the purpose was to benefit McIntosh, Dorsey was not aware of that intent. 206 The court was mindful of the duties of confidentiality, loyalty, and care that a lawyer owes to his or her client, 207 and refused to extend the lawyer's liability to a non-client where both the lawyer and the client did not expressly acknowledge that the lawyer intended to benefit the non-client. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, and found that the district court's order of summary judgment on this issue in favor of Dorsey was appropriate.
208
In cases where the non-party is a third-party beneficiary to the lawyer's contract with his or her client for services, the client and lawyer are aware of the risk of any conflict, and the non-party should be able to proceed with any claim against the lawyer for negligent drafting. But the liability of an attorney to a non-client should not be extended further. In a recent article, Professor Kevin H. Michels suggests that attorney liability for negligence should extend to non-clients in cases in which the attorney has a nexus-based relationship with the plaintiff and no attorney-specific limitation precludes the imposition of such a duty.
209
Michels does not apply his theory to negligent contract drafting. When drafting a contract, except with third-party beneficiaries, it is unlikely that the attorney creates a "nexus-based relationship" with a non-party to the contract by intending to "influence with information," or induce reliance by, a non-party. 210 A contract involves parties consenting to the exchange of rights; 211 the lawyer drafts the contract to facilitate that exchange of rights (as opposed to rights the parties create by relying on the contract) and, in the ordinary case, the lawyer does not intend for the contract (Minn. 1981) . In Lucas, the court stated, "[T]he determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury, and the policy of preventing future harm." McIntosh County Bank, 745 N.W.2d at 546 (quoting Lucas, 364 P.2d at 687) (alteration in original). The court in McIntosh County Bank stated that in the case of wills, gifts by deed, and trust agreements, the lawyer and client usually intend for a third party (e.g., beneficiary, donee) to benefit from the lawyer's services, which distinguishes those cases from the case before the court. See id. at 548. 206 McIntosh County Bank, 745 N.W.2d at 548. 207 See id. at 545. 208 Id. at 549. 209 See Michels, supra note 164, at 160-65. 210 See id. at 160. Professor Michels discusses attorney acts and omissions, in addition to communications, but contract drafting is attorney communication. That is not always the case with negotiations. 211 See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 20, at 270 ("Properly understood, contract law is that part of a system of entitlements that identifies those circumstances in which entitlements are validly transferred from person to person by their consent.").
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language to induce reliance by non-parties. Even if the lawyer is aware of the possibility that the contract could induce reliance by non-parties, that possibility is too uncertain to subject the attorney to liability.
B. Attorney Obligations to Counterparties
Even though an attorney intends to induce reliance by a counterparty, extending attorney liability for negligent drafting to counterparties fails the second part of Michels's test. 212 There is, in this context, an attorney-specific limitation on creating a duty. A contract is a bargained-for exchange;
213 a lawyer has a duty of loyalty to his or her client to get the "best" bargain possible.
214 Imposing a duty on an attorney to a counterparty undermines that obligation, just as how a lawyer cannot generally represent and be loyal to two sides to a deal.
215
Such liability also potentially undermines the client's trust in the contracting process.
216
The only exception should be where a counterparty is a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the 212 See Michels, supra note 164, at 162-65. 213 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) ("Except [in some enumerated circumstances], the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration."). 214 215 Lawyers should be cautious about agreeing to represent both sides of a contract. See Dzienkowski, supra note 164, at 797-98 (stating that although the Model Rules were "drafted with the underlying assumption that multiple clients should be able to hire one lawyer and consent to an agreement [,] . . . [t] he law of professional responsibility should not allow a lawyer-intermediary to complete an agreement without examining the effect of the agreement on each party's best interests"). Courts and bar associations generally prefer individuals seek their own legal counsel in most situations. See id. at 759 ("Over the years . . . several courts and bar associations strongly discouraged the simultaneous representation of buyers and sellers of real estate because this situation involved such a serious conflict of interest. In the context of divorce practice, the courts and bar associations viewed the fault nature of the proceedings as creating an impermissible conflict of interest between the spouses."). 216 See infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text. The same analysis applies to a lawyer drafting a "form" contract. The lawyer's duty is to draft terms that are in the client's best interest while obeying the law. Imposing a duty of due care to consumers who are parties to a "form" contract the attorney drafts risks interfering with the lawyer's duties to the client and chilling lawyers. A lawyer, torn between loyalty to the client and a duty to the consumers who do business with the client, might decide not to draft or review "form" contracts altogether. The consumer can always challenge the contract against the lawyer's client, and the disciplinary rules place limits on attorney conduct. The courts in the following cases faced the issue of whether an attorney was liable to a counterparty to a contract for negligent drafting. In Chalpin v. Brennan, Arizona's court of appeals in a case of first impression adopted the traditional privity rule that attorneys do not have a duty of care to non-clients. 218 Brennan, corporate counsel for Mobile Gardens, drafted "merged contracts for option and an employmentmanagement agreement which contain[ed] certain material misrepresentations of fact." 219 Chalpin, a non-party to the merged contracts, filed suit against Brennan for negligence, alleging that he relied on the misrepresentations when deciding to purchase stock in Mobile Gardens. 220 The court held that Chalpin could not recover from Brennan for legal malpractice because there was no contract for legal services between them. 221 Without addressing whether Brennan actually made factual misrepresentations, the court held that Brennan's overriding duty of "zealous representation" to his client, Mobile Gardens, was incompatible with any duty to third parties. 222 To hold otherwise, the court held, would encourage reliance by third parties on their adversary's legal counsel, causing them to forgo seeking legal representation. 223 The court stated that the proper remedy for Brennan's alleged misrepresentations was through disciplinary proceedings, 224 apparently for fraud. 225 What the court curiously failed to address was why the plaintiff could not sue the attorney for fraud, as opposed to professional negligence, where privity is not required. 226 Fraud is an ethical violation, and a defense to enforceability of a contract, so holding an attorney liable for fraud would not have interfered with the attorney's loyalty to his client. The plaintiff should therefore have been allowed to proceed against the attorney on that basis.
It is unclear whether the outcome of Chalpin would be the same today. Indeed, the strict privity requirement the court adopted in Chalpin
Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland. 227 In Donnelly Construction Co., the court permitted a contractor to recover from an architect who negligently drafted plans and specifications, even though the contractor and the architect were not in privity of contract. 228 Although the court did not expressly overrule Chalpin, it stated, "There is no requirement of privity in this state to maintain an action in tort." 229 The court in Franko v. Mitchell essentially affirmed this finding from Donnelly Construction Co. and set forth Arizona's framework for determining lawyer liability, which permits recovery if the attorney owed a duty to a third party that is derivative of his or her duty to the client and certain policy factors weigh in favor of imposing liability. 230 The third party cannot recover from the attorney unless "there was negligence between the attorney and his client" or a fiduciary relationship between the attorney and the third party. 231 This approach raises the same risks in the negligent-drafting context as the court raised in Chalpin-parties to contracts might rely on their counterparties' counsel and forgo representation or rely on their own judgment. 232 Attorneys might also have conflicting loyalties if some interests of the parties to the contract coincide (so that the attorney could be negligent to both sides), even though other interests differ.
The facts of Franko v. Mitchell are particularly alarming. In Franko, an unmarried couple, Franko and Markoff, entered into a contract for Franko to loan money to Markoff to begin his own business. 233 The couple sought the assistance of an attorney, Mitchell, purportedly "to protect" Franko. 234 Mitchell drafted the contract and both parties signed. 235 Franko thought that she was protected if Markoff defaulted by an "interest" in the eventual sale of Markoff's home and an insurance policy on his life, but Markoff never took out the required life insurance and Franko could not reach the proceeds on the sale of Markoff's home. 236 The loan was therefore uncollectible. 237 There was some question as to whether Mitchell was in fact Franko's attorney; the court held that there was enough evidence to sustain an inference that he was. 238 The more interesting issue, however, was whether, even if Mitchell was not Franko's attorney, he was liable to her LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:3 under a third-party beneficiary theory. Franko argued that the sole purpose of the contract was to protect her. 239 The court noted that Markoff told Franko that they should have a lawyer prepare "the loan documentation to provide the protection Markoff wanted Franko to have." 240 Even with this evidence, the court rejected the third-party beneficiary claim. 241 The court stated that third-party beneficiary claims are possible, despite the absence of privity between the lawyer and third party. 242 The court set forth a two-part test to determine third-party liability. 243 First, the court said "any duty owed by an attorney to a third party is derivative of the duty owed by that attorney to his client." 244 Thus, "at a minimum, there must be an allegation that the defendant attorney was negligent towards his client." 245 the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injuries suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.
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Franko could not get past the first inquiry-she could not show that the attorney was negligent to his own client, Markoff. 249 It is notable how the court established a framework that in effect substituted its own ad hoc judgment for whether an attorney could owe a duty of care to a counterparty to a contract, for the client's and attorney's own judgment. The court should have asked whether Franko was a third-party beneficiary to the attorney's contract with Markoff for legal services. 250 If she were, Mitchell assumed a duty of care to Franko, regardless of the outcome of the court's two-part test. The court's approach, in the contract-drafting context, was wrong. 239 See id. at 1352. 240 Id. at 1347. 241 Id. at 1352. 242 Id. 243 Id. at 1354. 244 Id. 245 Id. 246 Id. 247 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that an attorney for a former guardian who misappropriated an incompetent person's funds could be held liable to successor guardian for negligence). 248 Id. at 990. 249 Franko, 762 P.2d at 1355. 250 See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
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Brooks, a question that thirdparty beneficiary law would have answered.
The court in Brooks v. Zebre did not apply third-party beneficiary law at all in concluding that a counterparty to a contract could not sue the attorney who drafted it for negligent drafting. 251 In Brooks, an attorney (Zebre) drafted an unconscionable contract involving the sale of Brooks's ranch to the Arambels (Zebre's client). 252 The district court rescinded the contract. 253 Still, Brooks sought to recover damages from Zebre under the theories of negligence, gross negligence, and fraud. 254 The issue in the case was whether Zebre could be held liable to Brooks (who is a non-client) under any of the theories alleged. 255 The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Zebre and dismissed all claims. 256 For the negligence claim, the court held that an attorney owes no duty to an adversarial non-client, which Brooks was, because any duty would have violated his or her primary duty to the client. 257 The court also found that "no private cause of action in favor of a non-client can be found attributable to violations of the disciplinary rules relating to attorneys." 258 As to the plaintiff's fraud claim, the court held that the plaintiff did not plead any actual misstatement or omission by the attorney. 259 Yet, as the dissent noted, the drafting of the unconscionable contract itself, compounded by Zebre encouraging Brooks to sign the contract without advice of her lawyer, should have been enough to impose liability on re for fraud. 260 In fact, the dissent pointed out that the relationship between Brooks and the Arambels was not adversarial: there was no litigation involved, and Brooks was not represented by an attorney. 261 Moreover, the dissent argues that even if it would otherwise have been an adversarial relationship, Zebre assumed the responsibility of an advising attorney to Brooks when he advised her not to hire her own counsel. 262 Therefore, the dissent found that Brooks should have been able to pursue his negligence claims. 263 The critical question that the majority and dissent did not address was whether both Zebre and the Arambels agreed that Zebre could protect both the Arambels and Despite the rousing dissent in Brooks, the reality is that taken together, Franko and Brooks show how difficult it is for counterparties to a contract to succeed on a claim for negligence against the attorney who drafted the contract.
IV. RATIONALE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Part IV examines the rationale for the functional interpretation of the ethical rules discussed in this Article and offers recommendations for how lawyers drafting contracts can comply with the disciplinary rules and avoid third-party liability.
A. Rationale
In a contract, by definition, parties mutually assent to an exchange of rights. 264 One of the roles of lawyers drafting contracts is to facilitate that exchange and promote trust that promises will be enforceable. 265 Thus, it is contract law itself that should help define the ethical rules for attorneys in the contract-drafting context.
First, although fraud does not necessarily preclude assent, 266 it creates a disparity between the rights the parties agreed to exchange and the resources that they actually exchanged. The gap is created in part because parties lose trust when they do not receive the resources that they believed they exchanged. If, for example, a lawyer drafts a fraudulent representation as to certain goods in a sales contract, the lawyer makes an "intrinsic" misrepresentation as to the goods. 267 Laws, as do the ethical rules, remedy such an "unjust gap." 268 Negligence by a contracting party generally does not give the other party to the contract such a remedy, at least when the misrepresentation is not material. 269 The fact that the disciplinary rules do not remedy fraud that is reckless, as opposed to fraud that is knowing, 270 reflects concern for only disciplining attorneys for "knowing" misconduct rather than an inconsistency between contract rules and ethical rules.
Second, parties cannot assent to invalid terms. 271 For example, if a lawyer drafts a "form" warranty in which the seller disclaims any right of the buyer to recover consequential damages for personal injury, that clause is unenforceable.
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The consumer cannot assent to that disclaimer, and placing such a provision in a warranty prevents consumers and third parties from relying on the warranty and trusting that it is enforceable. Prohibiting an attorney from drafting invalid clauses, or requiring conspicuous disclosure that an invalid provision might be unenforceable, is consistent with contractual assent.
Third, ambiguous language interferes with contractual enforcement. It creates the risk that the court will enforce a bargain other than that to which the parties thought they were assenting, which interferes with trust in contractual relationships. 273 Further, contracts define to the contracting parties and to others the rights exchanged, while ambiguous language threatens the "boundary defining" function of contract law. 274 Consequently, a functional interpretation of Model Rule 8. 4 in the contract-drafting context could preclude "conscious ambiguity."
B. Recommendations
The following are recommendations for attorneys to fulfill their ethical obligations and not incur liability to third parties when drafting contracts.
• The lawyer should not knowingly or recklessly include false representations in a contract or warranties that the client cannot fulfill, and should use other provisions of the contract to allocate risk. The lawyer should also use due care in drafting representations and warranties. If the client incurs liability to the (1977) ("One who . . . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information."); id. § 552C ("One who . . . makes a misrepresentation of a material fact for the purpose of inducing the other to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though it is not made fraudulently or negligently."). 270 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. 271 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 272 See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2002 the attorney risks incurring liability to his or her client.
• When drafting a contract, the attorney should mark all proposed changes in each draft using, for example, "track changes," redline, or blackline, and insist that opposing counsel do the same. The lawyer should carefully review the final agreement line-by-line with the client before the client signs it. The lawyer should reveal any transcription error to opposing counsel, but consider whether first to discuss the error with his or her client.
• Attorneys should avoid ambiguous, as opposed to vague, language when drafting. They should clarify ambiguity in draft language proposed by opposing counsel.
• Lawyers should not include provisions in agreements that they know are invalid, especially in "form" contracts. As an alternative, when in doubt as to a provision's validity, a lawyer can disclose conspicuously that the provision might be invalid in certain jurisdictions.
• When retained by a client to draft an agreement, the lawyer should include language in the retainer agreement that no third party is a "direct" or "intended" beneficiary of the lawyer's services, unless the lawyer and the client agree for the lawyer to assume a duty to the third party and the lawyer can do so without sacrificing his or her loyalty to the client.
• When drafting an agreement on behalf of a client where the counterparty does not have an attorney, the lawyer might suggest that the counterparty hire an attorney, and, if he or she cannot afford to do so, the attorney should consider recommending that the client hire an attorney on his or her behalf, particularly when a disparity of bargaining power exists (e.g., the counterparty is an employee). 276 That might not be met with unalloyed enthusiasm by the client, so another alternative is for the lawyer to suggest that the counterparty seek representation from a law school clinic or other free legal services provider. turn next.
V. CONCLUSION
Functional ethical rules for contract drafting come from contract law itself. But that ethic only begins the dialogue. While regulatory rules proscribe attorney misconduct, they fail to give any prescription for the values and norms attorneys should adopt in transactional drafting.
Legal educators have increasingly recognized the need to teach law students professional values as distinct from ethical rules of responsibility. 277 Honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are among those values. 278 They facilitate the increased emphasis in contract drafting and negotiation on cooperation, and the decreasing emphasis on competition. This shifting emphasis helps enable lawyers to build the trust among commercial parties 279 that is critical to the success of business relationships. 280 Those values also could be at the core of how lawyers draft "form" contracts with language that is clearer and easier to read, helping consumers gain confidence in the companies with whom they do business. The professionalism of transactional lawyers is critical to improving the trust at the core of economic relationships. How to instill and teach this professionalism is where the dialogue must
